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On October 1, Representative Paul Kanjorski (D-PA) introduced in Congress legislation that
substantially mirrors the Obama administration’s proposal for the regulation of investment
advisers to hedge funds and certain other private investment funds (the “Registration Bill”).1
The Registration Bill is the most recent of a series of legislative proposals that would mandate
registration of hedge fund managers.2 Its stated purpose is to amend the U.S. Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 (the “Advisers Act”) “to require advisers of certain unregistered investment
companies to register with and provide information to the Securities and Exchange Commission,
and for other purposes.”
This paper asserts that there are (at least) two flaws with the Registration Bill that should be
addressed before any version of the Bill becomes law. In particular, the Registration Bill
embodies an inadequate understanding of the use of the term “client” in the Advisers Act and
the rules that the SEC has adopted under that Act. In addition, its definition of “private fund”
reflects a misunderstanding of the exemptions from registration under the U.S. Investment
Company Act of 1940 (the “Investment Company Act”) on which private funds rely. This paper
will discuss each of these items in turn, suggesting that the Registration Bill would do more to
further sound and coherent policy if it reflected a better understanding of aspects of the Advisers
Act and the Investment Company Act.
I.

The Definition of “Client”

One problematic aspect of the Registration Bill is its passing on the opportunity to define “client,”
thereby likely perpetuating a definition in which each private fund an adviser manages (rather
than the investors in those funds) is deemed the adviser’s client. That definition not only makes
little sense given that the investors are the ones making the decision to put their capital with a
fund’s adviser but also frustrates efficient resource allocation and the regulatory efficacy of
numerous substantive provisions of the Advisers Act. Moreover—and particularly significant in
the current environment, in which policymakers and regulators are pursuing encompassing
financial regulatory reform—it also arguably undermines a primary policy objective of securities
regulation: investor protection.
More specifically, rather than tackling the meaning of “client” itself, the Registration Bill would
delegate that authority to the SEC, granting it discretion to “ascribe different meanings to terms
... used in different sections” of the Advisers Act, including the term “client.” The inclusion of
that authority presumably arises from the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals’ rejection of the SEC’s
attempt in 2004 to change the meaning of “client” for purposes of the so-called “private adviser
exemption” set forth in Section 203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act.3
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See Anita K. Krug, Financial Regulatory Reform and Private Funds, Berkeley Center for Law, Business
& the Economy White Paper (July 13, 2009), at 2, available at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/FinancialRegulatoryReform_Krug.07.09(1).pdf.
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See, e.g., Private Fund Transparency Act of 2009, S. 1276, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposed by Sen.
Jack Reed (D-RI) in June); Hedge Fund Adviser Registration Act of 2009, H.R. 711, 111th Cong. (2009)
(proposed by Representatives Michael Castle (R-DE) and Michael Capuano (D-MA) in January); Private
Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2009, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposed by the Obama
administration in July).
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That exemption, which generally allows advisers with fewer than 15 “clients” who do not hold
themselves out to the public as investment advisers to avoid registering with the SEC under the Advisers
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As background, in an effort to require more hedge fund advisers to become registered with the
SEC under the Advisers Act, the SEC adopted a rule under the Advisers Act pursuant to which,
for purposes of the 15-client limitation of the private adviser exemption, a hedge fund adviser
would need to count as clients each investor in each fund that it managed, rather than each
fund it managed. For other purposes of the Advisers Act, however, the definition of client was
not to change—meaning that a hedge fund adviser would continue to regard each fund it
managed as their client in connection with complying with the Advisers Act’s substantive
requirements. The D.C. Circuit vacated the rule on the basis that the SEC had exceeded its
authority in changing the definition of “client.”4
Although it may be appropriate to grant the SEC the authority to define many terms under the
Advisers Act, Congress should itself confront the term “client” in order to address anomalies that
have arisen from the current definition—and that apparently have received little consideration or
discussion in the past year or, indeed, in the past decade. After all, if, as many assume, a
version of the Registration Bill will be enacted, the SEC may not deem addressing the definition
of client a particularly urgent endeavor. Given that the Registration Bill would eliminate the
private adviser exemption for most U.S. hedge fund advisers, Congress’s giving the SEC
authority to define “client” and other terms in the Advisers Act would no longer have any
implications for the concerns driving the SEC’s 2004 attempt to mandate registration.5
What, then, is problematic about the current interpretation of “client”? The laws and regulations
governing investment advisers exist to protect the beneficiaries of the investment advice that an
investment adviser provides. Those beneficiaries are the individuals and entities that engage
the adviser to provide services for their benefit—i.e., the management of their assets (or assets
under their control). Most obvious, then, it is somewhat illogical that, in the context of hedge
funds and other private funds, those beneficiaries are not the persons to whom the adviser
owes its obligations, which are fiduciary in nature. (Arguably, the focus of the Registration Bill
and regulatory reform discussions on requiring private fund advisers to become registered with
the SEC may be obscuring the fact that advisers in fact do not owe their obligations to the
persons (fund investors) who made the decision to place their assets with the adviser.)
Beyond being counterintuitive, that circumstance produces adverse effects. Among others, it
results in anomalies in the application of myriad provisions of the Advisers Act. It arguably also
may increase agency costs and, in turn, market inefficiencies.
As an initial matter, the current definition of “client” produces the result that an adviser—which,
again, is subject to obligations under the Advisers Act to disclose various types of information to

Act, has permitted many large private fund managers to remain unregistered on the basis that, in the
private fund context, each fund an adviser managers—rather than each investor in those funds—is
regarded as the adviser’s “client.” That interpretation of “client” has meant that advisers may manage up
to 14 private funds and remain unregistered, so long as they do not hold themselves out as advisers.
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After the SEC determined not to seek certiorari from the Supreme Court, many hedge fund advisers
that became registered in the wake of the rule’s adoption withdrew that registration, returning matters to
the status quo ante.
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That authority would, however, circumvent similar rulemaking obstacles in the future, a result that the
Obama administration and Representative Kanjorski may have deemed worth ensuring in the regulatory
reform initiatives.
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its clients—is obligated to disclose that information to the funds it manages, rather than to the
investors in the funds. However, when the adviser is the party that formed and controls those
funds (as their general partner, for example), as is often the case when the adviser is marketing
the funds based on its abilities and expertise, the Adviser’s disclosure obligations effectively are
obligations to disclose information to itself.
Another example concerns penalties for a client’s termination of advisory services. In situations
in which an adviser manages someone’s assets not through a fund but through a “separately
managed account” arrangement, the SEC deems it a violation of antifraud principles for the
adviser to restrict the client’s ability to terminate his or her advisory contract, or to subject the
client to termination penalties. By contrast, investors in private funds are commonly subject to
“lock-up” provisions that prevent them from redeeming their interests in the funds for
considerable periods of time. Fund investors may be subject to “early redemption penalties”
when they withdraw, or they may be subject to fees for services they did not receive in
connection with redemptions. That happens when a fund pays management fees for each
period in advance, and an investor withdraws in the middle of the period. Except as may be
provided by contract, the adviser is under no obligation to refund prepaid fees.
A third example concerns procedures that an adviser has to follow in engaging a third party—
called a solicitor or marketer—to find new potential clients and introduce them to the adviser.
The relevant rule under the Advisers Act—the cash solicitation rule—sets out myriad
requirements that an adviser needs to comply with. Among them, the adviser needs to require
the solicitor to provide solicited persons with information about the compensation the adviser is
paying the solicitor; the nature of the relationship between the solicitor and the adviser; and
whether any additional fees are being paid by the solicited person as a result of the solicitation
arrangement. Those requirements do not apply in connection with the adviser’s engagement of
a solicitor to solicit investors for the funds managed by the adviser.
In each of these examples (and there are others), the differences between the treatment of
clients versus the treatment of investors is an elevation of form over substance.
Beyond those effects, however, the current definition of client arguably creates agency costs
and may well impede efficient resource allocation. Under agency cost theory, fiduciary duties
are a mechanism for reducing oversight costs, particularly where an agent has broad discretion
and there exists an asymmetry of information between principal and agent. However, the
circumstance that advisers are fiduciaries to their clients loses normative power when the “thing”
to which duties are owed is a fund that is under management’s (the adviser’s) control. That is
because it is the investor who puts his or her capital at risk in the fund and makes the decisions
regarding his or her investment, and it is the investor who has an interest evaluating whether to
leave his or her capital in the fund or to withdraw it and deploy it elsewhere.
It is the investor, therefore, who has the primary interest in reducing agency costs—and agency
cost reduction could be better achieved if investors were the beneficiaries of the adviser’s
fiduciary obligations.6
These are problems that the Registration Bill, as it currently stands, will not correct. Beyond
6

In addition, there is nothing in regulatory or legislative history or judicial precedent to warrant keeping
the current definition of “client.” If anything, the legislative history of the Advisers Act supports the notion
that private fund investors should be seen as advisory clients for purposes of the Advisers Act.
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that, however, by perpetuating the current definition of “client” (with no assurances that the SEC
will exercise its authority to change that definition), the Registration Bill arguably undermines the
policy objectives behind financial regulatory reform efforts.
To be sure, as the Obama administration articulated in proposing the legislation reflected in the
Registration Bill, a primary objective behind that legislation is mitigation of systemic risk, a goal
for which changing the meaning of “client” may not be relevant. However, at least since the
regulatory reforms made in the wake of the Great Depression, the primary goal of securities
regulation generally (including as it relates to regulating financial institutions) has been the
protection of investors—the persons who place their savings and other available assets in the
securities and capital markets.7 In addition, despite the apparent focus of many current
regulatory reform initiatives on reducing systemic risk, current policy discussions reflect a
continued recognition of investor protection as an objective guiding the formulation of securities
regulation and policy, particularly in light of recent and substantial investor losses that resulted
from myriad events and circumstances.
Because a new definition of “client”—one under which a fund’s investors are to be regarded as
the clients of the fund’s adviser—would extend substantive investor protections to those who
actually make the decision to place capital with the fund’s adviser, Congress’s declining to
address the issue serves to undermine a dominant goal of securities regulation and reform.
Accordingly, Congress should replace the doctrine under which hedge funds and other private
funds (rather than investors in those funds) are regarded as the “clients” of the funds’ advisers
with this new definition, at least to the extent that the adviser sponsored and/or controls the
fund, and investors bought interests in the fund on the basis of the adviser’s particular skills,
expertise, or investment strategies.
II.

Definition of “Private Fund”

The Registration Bill’s definition of “private fund” is flawed in that, although it is based on a
provision of the Investment Company Act that, by its terms, applies only to U.S. funds, it
nonetheless purports to encompass non-U.S. funds that are privately offered in the United
States. Although the effects of that doctrinal incoherence are not necessarily readily
discernible, at the least it will likely render the Bill’s application confusing.
The Registration Bill’s operative provision, for purposes of investment adviser registration
requirements, is to deny advisers to private funds the ability to avail themselves of the private
adviser exemption.8 The Registration Bill would amend the private adviser exemption to specify
that the private adviser exemption is available only to “foreign private fund advisers”—which are
defined as investment advisers that (i) have no place of business in the United States; (ii) had,
during the preceding 12 months, fewer than 15 clients in the United States and less than
$25,000,000 under management (or such higher amount as the SEC may specify); (iii) do not
hold themselves out to the public in the United States as investment advisers; and (iv) do not
act as investment advisers to any investment companies registered as such under the
Investment Company Act (such as mutual funds) or certain business development companies.
Accordingly, U.S. investment advisers that currently rely on the private adviser exemption would
7
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8

See supra note 3.

Berkeley Center for Law, Business and the Economy

5

HR-3818: The Private Fund Adviser Registration Act

November 2009

need to become registered as investment advisers with the SEC and comply with the
substantive requirements of the Advisers Act9 (which the Registration Bill would amend to,
among other things, require that private fund advisers maintain certain types of books and
records as to the private funds they manage and report certain types of information about those
funds periodically to the SEC).10
The Registration Bill’s definition of “private fund,” however, reflects a misunderstanding of
current law. As the Registration Bill defines it, a private fund is an investment fund that “would
be an investment company under section 3(a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 but for
the exception provided from that definition by either sections 3(c)(1) or section 3(c)(7)” of the
Investment Company Act and that either is organized or otherwise created under the laws of the
United States or that has at least 10% of its outstanding securities owned by U.S. persons.
Accordingly, by extending the definition to funds that were not necessarily created under “the
laws of the United States,” the definition encompasses some funds formed in other countries.11
This definition of “private fund” should be familiar to U.S. hedge fund and private equity fund
advisers because the funds those advisers sponsor and manage typically avoid having to
become registered with the SEC under the Investment Company Act by virtue of meeting the
requirements of Section 3(c)(1), which limits the number of investors the fund may have and
requires that the fund offer its interests privately, or Section 3(c)(7), which requires that each
investor in the fund meet certain relatively high financial sophistication standards and likewise
requires that the fund offer its interests privately.
Insofar as U.S. funds are concerned, the definition works. What the Registration Bill fails to
reflect, however, is that funds organized outside the United States, by virtue of the Investment
Company Act’s framework, by definition cannot rely on the Section 3(c)(1) and Section 3(c)(7)
9

Specifically, advisers that are registered as such under the Advisers Act currently are obligated to,
among other things, provide various types of disclosure to their clients and, in certain circumstances,
obtain the consent of clients (such as to assign the advisory contract with the client or to engage in
certain types of transactions with the client’s assets). Registered advisers also need to adopt and adhere
to an array of policies and procedures that are intended to address the particular risks and conflicts that
inhere in the advisers’ particular businesses, and each adviser must designate a “chief compliance
officer” to oversee the adviser’s compliance program. In addition, each registered adviser, every few
years, will be visited by SEC staff, who will examine the adviser’s books and records to evaluate whether
the adviser is complying with its obligations under the Advisers Act.
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The Registration Bill would additionally amend two other exemptions to remove any possibility the
advisers to private funds could rely on them. In particular, it would eliminate any prospect that private
fund advisers could remain unregistered under an exemption currently applicable to any adviser
registered with the CFTC as a commodity trading advisor or another exemption available to an adviser
whose clients are all residents of the state in which the adviser maintains its principal place of business.
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The rationale for extending the definition to non-U.S. funds is evident. Many private fund advisers
based in the United States sponsor and manage funds formed in the Cayman Islands, British Virgin
Islands, or another of several “tax haven” jurisdictions. They do that in order to create investment
vehicles that are accommodating to the tax needs of investors that are exempt from U.S. taxation (such
as pension plans and charitable foundations) and non-U.S. investors, who often prefer investing non-U.S.
entities for their own tax planning needs. The Registration Bill seeks to bring non-U.S. funds within its
purview presumably because of the substantial amount of assets managed in those non-U.S.
jurisdictions.
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exclusions. That result is the product of the fact that the term to which the exclusions expressly
apply—“investment company” as defined under section 3(a)—encompasses only U.S.
investment companies. Accordingly, the Section 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) exclusions are irrelevant for
any type of investment entity that would not be an “investment company” in the first place.
The Investment Company Act addresses non-U.S. investment companies in Section 7(d). That
section specifies that non-U.S. investment companies—or “offshore funds,” as they are
commonly called—may not register with the SEC as investment companies or publicly offer their
securities in the United States unless the SEC finds, as to any offshore fund, that the fund can
be effectively subjected to the same type of regulatory oversight as that to which U.S. funds are
subject. In other words, if an offshore fund were to seek to offer its securities publicly in the
United States, they effectively would need the SEC’s permission to do so.
Because of that regulatory hurdle, offshore funds initially (in the 1980s) sought to offer their
securities in the United States privately, on the premise that doing so would alleviate the Section
7(d) prohibitions (which, again, relate only to public offerings) and that no other provisions of the
Investment Company Act were relevant to offshore funds. However, the SEC determined that,
in order for offshore funds to engage in private offerings in the United States, they must meet
the requirements of Section 3(c)(1) or Section 3(c)(7) in connection with offerings to U.S.
persons, notwithstanding that, given the Investment Company Act’s structure, those provisions,
by their terms, are irrelevant to offshore fund offerings. In the SEC’s view, Section 7(d)
demonstrates Congress’s intent to require offshore funds whose conduct affects investors in the
United States to be subject to the same type of regulation governing U.S. funds.
An offshore fund, therefore, necessarily is not an investment company under Section 3(a) of the
Investment Company Act but for the exclusions provided by Sections 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7). That
conclusion, in turn, means that the definition of “private fund” in the Registration Bill is
incoherent insofar as it purports to capture certain offshore funds: a fund relying on a Section
3(c) exclusion cannot have been organized anywhere other than under the laws of the United
States.
Because of this confusion, a substantially better approach would be for the Registration Bill to
expressly acknowledge the different regulatory structure governing non-U.S. private funds,
including the ways (if any) in which those entities should be regarded differently from U.S. funds
for purposes of the Bill’s application.
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